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ARTICLE




One year after the invasion of Iraq, what lessons are to be drawn about the role of the Security
Council in peace and security? This article looks at the issue by considering the nature of
the Security Council in its dual functions as a forum for diplomacy and a corporate body for
executive action. The idea of the Security Council’s possessing a separate will in its executive
function is developed. The article stresses the importance for the authority of the Council of
that organ expressing its will within the legal parameters of the Charter and international
law. It is argued that similar legal parameters are also applicable to the permanent members
in exercising their power of veto and in interpreting resolutions. Further, when interpreting
resolutions member states should not misconstrue the will of the Council. The Iraq crisis of
2003 raised all these issues and, further, necessitated a reappraisal of the rules of international
law governing the use of force. This article considers the relationship between diminution in
Council authority and erosion of the rules of the UN Charter governing the threat or use of
force in international relations.
Keywords
interpretation; legal personality; permanent membership; resolutions; Security Council func-
tions; threat or use of force; veto
1. INTRODUCTION
Inis Claude, writing at the height of the ColdWar, stated that
The Security Council has not developed signiﬁcantly as a corporate entity, displaying
an emergent will and purpose that can be identiﬁed with it as a collective organ . . . 1
With the odd historical aberrations such as the Korean war, sanctions against
SouthernRhodesia and an arms embargo against SouthAfrica, theColdWarpreven-
ted the Security Council from developing a separate will through executive action.
This, however, did not prevent the Council from functioning. As Inis Claude noted,
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the requirement of consensus among the ﬁve permanent members of the Coun-
cil (P5) meant that the Council was intended to perform both an executive and a
diplomatic function:
The Council was designed to serve as an instrument of action whenever a unanimous
vote of the great powers revealed the existence of a consensus, and a forum for nego-
tiation whenever the use of the veto revealed the absence of a consensus. In the era
of the ColdWar, the Council has had more frequent occasion to function in the latter
capacity than in the former.2
It will not be argued here that a Council with a separate will is essential to
maintain the integrity of the UN Charter scheme for collective security, where the
only recognized exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force are self-defence
and Council-authorized military action. As Inis Claude noted, the presence of the
vetomeant that theCouncilwas intended toperformboth executive anddiplomatic
functions. Indeed, Claude claimed that the diplomatic function ‘is of primary, not
secondary, importance – and it is not a function on which the Council can merely
“fall back”, an alternative rolewhich is availablewhen action proves unattainable’.3
Thus the failure of the Council to perform its executive function did not unravel
the Charter scheme during the Cold War. This is contrary to the contention that
the ineffectiveness of the Council meant that the rules prohibiting the use of force
were denuded, since states would have to step in to perform a collective security
role. Such a rolewould breach the formal rules of theCharter, being takenneither in
self-defence nor under the authority of the Council.4 Such arguments were driven
by ‘the American . . . passion for making the United Nations an agency for action’.5
The fact is that the Charter schemewas created in the full knowledge that therewas
no guarantee that the Council would take action,6 hence the clear preservation of
the inherent right of self-defence that could only be affected if andwhen theCouncil
acted.7
Rather it is contended here that since the Council started to fulﬁl its potential
and realize its separatewill in the post-ColdWar era, caremust be taken to establish
the extent of that will, for it cannot possibly be unlimited. Moreover, extra care
must be taken accurately to understand the expression of that will. This article
will focus on both of these issues by considering brieﬂy the legal limits on the
powers of the Council, and the little-discussed legal regime that can be applied
to the permanent members. The argument will show that abuse of the law by
the organ is far outweighed by the anti-legal practice of the permanent members
when interpreting resolutions, casting vetoes, and abdicating their responsibilities
for peace and security. Both abuse of the law by the organ and by the permanent
2. Ibid., 83.
3. Ibid., 88.
4. E.g. W. M. Reisman, ‘Coercion and Self-determination: Construing Article 2(4)’, (1984) 78 AJIL 642; A. C.
Arend and R. J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force (1993), 179.
5. Claude, supra note 1, at 84. See, e.g., D. D. Caron, ‘The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security
Council’, (1993) 87 AJIL 552, at 561; S. D. Murphy, ‘The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of
Collective Security after the ColdWar’, (1994) 32 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 201, at 209.
6. S. C. Schlesinger,Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations (2003), 193–207.
7. I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (2003), 706.
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members has the potential to undermine the authority of the Council as the unique
collective security organ of the most important universal organization, and may
affect the rules governing the use of force.
Although always described as operating in a ‘political’ environment, any anti-
legal behaviour by the Security Council or the permanent members potentially
undermines the authority of the Council butmay also affect the legal scheme of the
UN Charter. It will be seen that this danger is most apparent when the Council is
operatingwithin thewider context of threats of force, as occurred in the build-up to
war in Iraq early in 2003. Whether this behaviour undermines what Brownlie has
called the ‘international consensus’, namely that ‘individual States, or a group of
States, cannot resort to force (for purposes other than self-defence) except with the
express authorization of the United Nations’,8 will be discussed in this article. That
both the rules of the Charter on the use of force and the authority of the Council
must be reappraised after the Iraq crisis of 2003 is demonstrated by the statement
made by Hans Blix, former executive chair of the UN Monitoring, Veriﬁcation and
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), in February 2004:
The states which we would have expected to support and strengthen some basic
principles of theUNorder, inmy view, set a precedent of ignoring or undermining this
order by acting too impatiently and without the support of the Security Council. As a
result, their own credibility has suffered and the authority of the UN Security Council
has been damaged.9
In tracing thewill of the SecurityCouncil through to its expression in resolutions
and then to its interpretation, implementation, and, on occasions, prevention by the
permanent members, focus will be given to the calamitous events leading to the
invasion and occupation of Iraq by the United States and the United Kingdom in
2003. The ﬁrst issue, however, is to establish what is meant by ‘separate will’ and
whether the Security Council has such.
2. THE WILL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
The issue of the will of the Council has to be approached by answering the more
general question about the presence of separate will in inter-governmental organiz-
ations.What signiﬁes that an international organization is an autonomous actor on
the international plane?Historically the debate has been about the existence of sep-
aratewill or volonte´ distincte, and traditionally the conundrumhas been, ‘How . . . can
an international organization, “made” by states which have no superiors in inter-
national law, be independent of the will of its members?’10
Schermers and Blokker suggest that an organization must have at least one
organ with a will of its own.11 Will is often expressed by international lawyers as
8. Ibid., 714. See also I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963), vii.
9. From a speech given at the University of Edinburgh, Independent, 25 Feb. 2004, 29.
10. D. J. Bederman, ‘The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personality and the Lighthouse at Cape
Spartel’, (1996) 36Virginia Journal of International Law 275, at 357.
11. H. Schermers and N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (2003), 34.
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the possession of international legal personality, although it can more widely be
expressed as the transference of will by the founding states to an organization or
the restrictions on the will of member states by an organization.12 The concepts
of international legal personality and that of separate will are conﬂated to a large
extent. Although the former is a much more legalistic concept than the latter, for
international lawtheexistenceofseparatewill is largelyencapsulatedbytheconcept
ofinternationallegalpersonality.Anorganizationwithcertainelementsispresumed
tohave international legal personality.13 Those elements vary betweenwriters,with
some emphasizing permanency, separate purposes, and distinct powers, as well
as organ(s);14 while others include organ(s), membership, and decision-making.15
While the existence of separate will is embodied in the concept of international
legal personality, the extent of separate will is to be found in the nature of those
elements: for instance in the presence of majority voting in the organs, the width of
purposes, the intrusiveness of powers, the nature of decision-making, and the depth
of membership. These reﬂect the fundamental legal nature of the organization,
whichmay tend towards the contractual or the constitutional.16
Organizations without personality – the G7 for instance – can be said to have
a separate existence but not a separate will, at least in a legal sense. True, the G7’s
communique´s reﬂect the collective view of seven states but, without separate will,
such communique´s donot have legal status asG7decisions per se.Without separate
will the G7 certainly has no lawmaking power. Regular G7 meetings indicate its
separate existence, but stateshavenot transferred anyof theirwill to theG7, or given
the G7 the elements that would enable it to develop a will of its own. Thus ‘for an
international entity to be regarded as existing separately from itsMember States, the
entitymust have a decision-making organ that is able to produce a “corporate” will,
as opposed to a mere “aggregate” of the wills of the Member States’.17 Nevertheless,
the impact of certain fora lacking formal personality should not be underestimated.
As Blokker notes, ‘G8 consensus was crucial in the spring of 1999 to “solve” the
Kosovo crisis’.18
Adecisionof the SecurityCouncil adopted in accordancewith its voting rules19 is
a reﬂection of the corporate will of the Security Council, not the aggregation of the
wills of the members of that body. The separate personality of the United Nations
12. States are often resistant to the latter view. See the criticism by the UK minister on the draft EU Constitu-
tion: ‘It is not the constitution that grants competences, but the member states, through the constitution’.
R.Watson, ‘Giscard’s Plan for Europe Swamped by Amendments’, The Times, 25 Feb. 2003, 16.
13. C. F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (1996), 89–90; J. Klabbers,
‘Presumptive Personality: The European Union in International Law’, in M. Koskenniemi (ed.), International
Legal Aspects of the European Union (1998), 243–9.
14. Brownlie, supra note 7, at 649. See further Amerasinghe, supra note 13, at 83; R. Higgins, Problems and Process:
International Law and HowWe Use It (1994), 47.
15. R. A.Wessel, ‘Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU’, (2000) 5European ForeignAffairs Review 507,
at 517.
16. For discussion of capacities and competences see P. H. F. Bekker, The Legal Position of Intergovernmental
Organizations (1994), 51–85.
17. Wessel, supra note 15, 517.
18. N. M. Blokker, ‘Proliferation of International Organizations: An Exploratory Introduction’, in N. M. Blokker
and H. G. Schermers (eds.), Proliferation of International Organizations: Legal Issues (2001), 1, at 6.
19. UN Charter, Art. 27.
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establishesthewillof theorganizationasawhole,althoughinthecaseof theSecurity
Council there is a concentration of will, enabling it, for example, to takemandatory
decisions imposing non-military measures binding on the whole membership, a
power it has utilized signiﬁcantly with the end of the Cold War. The International
Court of Justice in the Reparation case was inaccurate in stating that the United
Nations had a large measure of personality;20 personality is, after all, either present
or not. The Court was possibly alluding to the fact that the Charter confers a large
measure of separate independentwill on theUnitedNations,more on certainorgans
thanonothers. Personality is the startingpoint for legal analysis; after that theextent
of each organ’s will is to be found in their capacities or competences. Legal powers
are a signiﬁcant element in any analysis of this nature and these may be conferred
expressly or impliedly by member states, or may be developed and deployed by
the organization itself. The competence to legislate to create international criminal
tribunals or to legislate to combat terrorism,21 for instance, can hardly be said to
have been the intention of the founding states; in reality they are a creation of the
Security Council itself, a product of its separate will.
That the Council potentially had signiﬁcant separate will was evident in 1945.
Indeed,what occurredwas a collective actionof states imbuing the SecurityCouncil
with unique powers that individual states did not possess thereafter. Even if states
had a collective police power before 1945, at that point they embodied it for better
or for worse (though the intention was to improve the ambiguous and selective
nature of collective interventions) in the Security Council.22 It would be accurate
to state that the parameters, even the existence, of such a collective power before
the advent of the UNCharter was legally highly doubtful. It was by establishing the
United Nations that the majority of states decided to establish a body with novel
competence. The adoption of theUNCharter in 1945was a deﬁningmoment, not in
the sense of codifying an already existing legal regime, although one was arguably
emerging during the course of the Second World War with the idea of the United
Nations,23 but in the sense of creating a new world order, with the Charter having
the role of foundational constitutional document. Thereafter the United Nations
possessedpowerswhich states didnot, and arguablynever did, possess. The decision
to impose economic sanctions or authorize military action to deal with threats to
thepeace aswell aswith acts of aggressionbelongs to theSecurityCouncil, although
subsidiary responsibility arguably falls to the General Assembly.24 Even a modern-
day advocate of anticipatory self-defence accepts that while the Security Council
can take action against threats that are not imminent, states cannot.25
20. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1949] ICJ Rep. 174, at 179.
21. SC Res. 1373, 28 Sept. 2001.
22. Brownlie, supra note 8, 332–3; D. Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security (1999),
26–32.
23. See ‘Declaration by the United Nations’, 1 Jan. 1942, in R. B. Russell and J. M. Muther, A History of the United
Nations Charter (1958), Appendix C.
24. See N. D.White, ‘The Legality of Bombing in the Name of Humanity’, (2000) 5 Journal of Conﬂict and Security
Law 27.
25. C. Greenwood, ‘International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq’, (2003)
4 San Diego International Law Journal 7, at 36.
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3. THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Once theColdWar ended and the SecurityCouncil did start taking copious amounts
of action in developing its corporate will, there emerged other dangers to the UN
Charter scheme. Of course concerns about such dangers must be balanced against
thebeneﬁts toworldpeace that anactiveCouncil brings. Powerful states realized the
potential of the Security Council given the huge range of its powers and the limited
forms of accountability for their exercise. In general terms of legality and legitimacy
Security Council approval is the golden ﬂeece that powerful states seek to justify
not only coercive non-defensive action, but also other actions that infringe a state’s
sovereignty. This is graphically illustrated by the tremendous diplomatic efforts put
into securing ‘post-conﬂict’ Council resolutions on Iraq in 2003–4, endorsing ﬁrst
of all the occupation of the country by the United States and the United Kingdom,
then the creation of a multinational force, and ﬁnally the formation of a sovereign
interim government of Iraq.26
All those serious remaining doubts after Kosovo as to whether a state can under-
takehumanitarian interventionoranticipatoryactionare sweptaway if theSecurity
Council authorizes it as a response to a threat to thepeace.Whatever theweaknesses
of the Council, recent conﬂicts in Kosovo and Iraq, even Afghanistan, showed the
unique authority of that organ in collective securitymatters, as the statesusing force
attempted to justify their actions as coming under Security Council resolutions.
If powerful states manage to persuade the Council to adopt resolutions tackling
threats to or breaches of the peace within the meaning and purposes of the Charter
as developed by practice, then the international community generally accepts the
legitimacy of such actions andwill support theCouncil.Witness the support for the
Coalition in the Gulf conﬂict of 1991.27
This support, however, is subject to the Council acting within its competence.
Although the original UN member states at San Francisco recognized that each
organ determined its own competence,28 the ability of the Council to induce the
compliance of the whole membership will be reduced if it is generally perceived as
acting beyond the framework of the Charter.29 Although mechanisms of political
accountability in the United Nations are not strong, there is a rudimentary form of
accountabilitytomemberstates: rememberthatmostCouncildecisions,particularly
those adopted under Article 41, depend on states to act on them, for instance by not
trading with a sanctioned state. A resolution may be binding under Article 25 of
the Charter, but the actual implementation and therefore effectiveness of the action
will ultimately depend on states themselves taking the necessary actions against
their citizens and companies.30 Council authority is thus diminished by actions that
have the quality of ultra vires decisions, and importantly are perceived as such by
the wider membership.
26. SC Res. 1483, 22May 2003; SC Res. 1511, 16 Oct. 2003; SC Res. 1546, 8 June 2004.
27. P.-M. Dupuy, ‘The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited’, (1997) 1 Max
Planck Yearbook of UN Law 20.
28. UNCIO, vol. 13, 709.
29. T. M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995), 26.
30. Murphy, supra note 5, at 209.
THE WILL AND AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AFTER IRAQ 651
Of course it is possible that a lawful decision of the Security Council can still be
viewed as illegitimate by the membership judging against ‘some broader frame of
reference’.31 But this appears to be relatively rare in UN practice. Often the picture
is much more blurred, with resolutions against Libya and against terrorism having
question marks raised against their legality rather than there being a black-and-
white consensus about their legality. Such question marks affect the legitimacy of
theCouncil’s decisions and thusundermine its authority, butnot as greatly as a clear
ultra vires resolution.
It is not proposed here to detail legally problematic measures taken by the
Council. Such discussions have dominated legal literature on the Security Coun-
cil in the past decade.32 There has been a continuing debate since the measures
taken against Libya in 199233 about the limitations on the competence of the Se-
curity Council. Libya raised concerns regarding the use or misuse of the concept
of threat to the peace by the Council, as well as the ability of the Council to
override existing treaty rights and duties of states by virtue of Article 103 of the
Charter (in that case the treaty rights of Libya arising under the Montreal Con-
vention of 1971 to prosecute two suspects).34 The issue was intensiﬁed with the
adoption on 12 July 2002 of Resolution 1422, which grants immunity from the
International Criminal Court (ICC) to personnel from non-states parties involved
in UN-established or -authorized missions for a renewable twelve-month period;
here there was no explicit ﬁnding of a threat to the peace in what purported to
be a Chapter VII resolution, and the Council was not simply overriding the ob-
ligations of member states under the ICC Statute but the obligations of the Court
itself.35
Furthermore, there is no speciﬁc Charter provision in Chapter VII that can
expressly or implicitly be used to justify the decision made in Resolution 1422.
Article41hasbeenusedas thepegonwhich tohangnewdevelopmentsby theSecur-
ity Council: for example international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda,36 and modern-day protectorates in Kosovo and East Timor.37 Both of
these innovations can be seen as encouraging legitimate developments of the Se-
curity Council’s concern to promote a positive peace, a peace where protection of
human rights is combinedwith security. Thus they are prima facie compatiblewith
the purposes of the United Nations as developed in practice since 1945. However,
it is stretching Article 41 beyond breaking point to see the immunity of certain
personnel serving in UN forces as a ‘measure not involving the use of armed force’.
It is certainly not a ‘measure’ in the sense of economic or diplomatic sanctions,
31. Caron, supra note 5, at 559.
32. See, e.g., J. E. Alvarez, ‘Judging the Security Council’, (1996) 90 AJIL 1.
33. SC Res. 748, 31March 1992.
34. See discussion of the inconclusive Lockerbie cases inN. D.White, ‘To Review orNot To Review: The Lockerbie
Cases before theWorldCourt’, (1999) 12LJIL 401.Questions of Interpretation andApplication of the 1971Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahirya v. United Kingdom), Provisional
Measures, [1992] ICJ Rep. 3; Preliminary Objections, [1998] ICJ Rep. 26.
35. R. Cryer and N. D. White, ‘The Security Council and the International Criminal Court: Who’s Feeling
Threatened?’, (2002) 8 International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations 143.
36. Tadic´ case, No. IT-94-1-AR72, paras. 35–36.
37. M. J. Matheson, ‘United Nations Governance in Postconﬂict Societies’, (2001) 95 AJIL 76.
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or even international criminal tribunals or fourth-generation-style peace-support
operations.
The Security Council is a political body. It is inevitable that a member or group
of members of such a body wanting it to act in a certain way must persuade the
remainingmembers to itsway of thinking. In contrast to the failed proposed second
resolution against Iraq in early 2003, theUnited Stateswon the argument in the case
ofResolution1422 in2002.Should thismeantheendof thematter, since in thewords
of the ICJ in the Namibia case ‘a resolution of a properly constituted organ of the
United Nations which is passed in accordance with that organ’s rules of procedure,
and is declared by the President to have been so passed, must be presumed to have
been validly adopted’?38 However, sole reliance on that presumption without any
accompanyingattempt toaddress theunderlying legalproblemswith the resolution
undermines the authority of the Council. The Council is a political body with wide
discretionary powers, but that discretion is granted to it by a legal document – the
UN Charter. Discretion should and can be exercised in accordance with the law. As
early as 1948 the ICJ stated in the Admissions opinion that the ‘political character of
an organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions established
by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its
judgment’.39
The pressure to obtain UN authority for acts that individual states do not have
the right to take unilaterally has led to the Council pushing against the constraints
of the UN Charter but rarely clearly exceeding its generous parameters. Resolution
1422 is the clearest example of a decision that is extremely difﬁcult if not impossible
to reconcilewithUNlaw.However, legallyprecariousdecisions suchas thoseagainst
Libya and those against terrorism in general40 may also erode the authority of the
Security Council if states view them as tainted and illegitimate and, more partic-
ularly, if they do not observe them.41 Empirical evidence on the implementation
of the Council’s anti-terrorism legislation has yet to be gathered, although initial
data from the Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee is encouraging in terms of
member-state compliance.42 Certainly sanctions against Libya did see evidence of
non-observance, especially by African states.43 Although many states voiced their
objections to the drafts that eventually led to Resolution 1422,44 it is unlikely that
therewill be any signiﬁcant testingof states’willingness to complywith it, given the
slimpossibilityof the immunitypurportedlygivenby that resolutionbeing tested.45
38. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, [1971] ICJ Rep. 16, at para. 20.
39. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1948] ICJ Rep. 57,
at 64.
40. SC Res. 1373, 28 Sept. 2001.
41. What has been described as the erosion of ‘the receptivity of members to the views of the Council’ – S. R.
Ratner, ‘The Security Council and International Law’, in D. M. Malone (ed.), The UN Security Council (2004),
591, at 603.
42. C. A. Ward, ‘Building Capacity to Combat International Terrorism: The Role of the United Nations Security
Council’, (2003) 8 Journal of Conﬂict and Security Law 289, at 299.
43. E. deWet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (2004), 382.
44. SC 4568thmtg, 10 July 2002.
45. Cryer andWhite, supra note 35, at 159–60.
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Nevertheless, the consequence of such decisions is the potential diminution of the
authority of the Council.
The Council, even with the limitation of the veto, has taken measures that may
be questionable in terms of the Charter and undermine the development of peace
and security based on respect for human rights. On the other hand its development
of international criminal tribunals and fourth-generation-typepeace-support opera-
tions illustrates how theCouncil candevelop its powers topromote apositive peace.
The dominant desire in the international community for theUnitedNations to play
the leading role in post-conﬂict Iraq from April 2003 onwards reﬂects the unique
authority and legitimacy of theUnitedNations in this role, developed by its practice
in Kosovo and East Timor. The Security Council’s endorsement of a post-conﬂict
coalition of the willing in Iraq in Resolution 148346 is a positive development, in
the sense that it at least shows a recognition of the legitimacy that such authority
confersby those statespreviouslyquestioning the relevanceof theCouncil. It is a less
appealing development given that the role of theUnitedNations in the post-conﬂict
stage ismuchreduced, althoughAfghanistan in2001alsomanifestedadownplaying
of the United Nations’ role in post-conﬂict administration.
4. THE EXPRESSION OF WILL
Resolution 1483 does, however, make it clear that the United States and the United
Kingdom must act consistently with the Charter and other principles of inter-
national law in post-conﬂict Iraq, although its terms seem to be deliberately am-
biguous. Resolution 1483 was adopted under Chapter VII in response to the con-
tinuing threat to international peace and security caused by the situation in Iraq. It
recognized the ‘speciﬁc authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applic-
able international laws’ of the United States and the United Kingdom as ‘occupying
powers under uniﬁed command’ called ‘the Authority’.47 It further called upon ‘the
Authority, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant
international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective
administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restor-
ation of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which
the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future’.
That resolution and subsequent resolutions on the subject indicate that the pro-
cess by which the Iraqi people realize their internal right of self-determination is
by free and fair elections. True, neither Resolution 1483 nor the meeting at which
the Council gave authority to the United States and the United Kingdom used
the term ‘elected’ government as the end-product of the realization of internal
self-determination, preferring instead the more elliptical phrase, an ‘internation-
ally recognized, representative government’ of Iraq.48 However, the United Nations’
46. SC Res. 1483, 22May 2003.
47. On the effect of Resolution 1483 on the law of occupation see D. Scheffer, ‘Beyond Occupation Law’, (2003)
97 AJIL 842.
48. SCRes.1483,22May2003.SeeSC4761stmtg,22May2003.OnlyGermanyspokeofa ‘democratic’government.
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consistent promotion of democracy since the early 1990s in those member states
requesting its assistance has been based on the expression of the will of the people
in free and fair elections.49 Given this practice, it would have been difﬁcult for the
United States and the United Kingdom to deny it as the process for achieving a
representative government. As Johnstone rightly observes, ‘a given text is always en-
countered in a situation or ﬁeld of practice and therefore can only be understood in
the light of the position it occupies in that enterprise’.50 Bearing inmind the speciﬁc
ﬁeld of the promotion of democracy by the United Nations, which is based on free
and fair elections, it follows that ‘representative government’ within the context of
Iraqmeans an elected government.51 Thiswasmade clear in a later Security Council
resolution.52 The January 2004 plan of the United States and the United Kingdom
to have a selection process for an interim Iraqi government to take over from the
GoverningCouncil established in July 2003 atﬁrst seems incompatiblewith thewill
of the Security Council, although the plan still foresees the holding of elections in
2005 when security within the country has been achieved.53 This process was not
much changed by the adoption of Council Resolution 1546 of 8 June 2004, which
endorsed the formation of a sovereign interim government of Iraq to take power
at the end of June 2004, thereby formally ending the occupation of the country by
the United States and the United Kingdom. Although the presence of the multi-
national force continues after 30 June, the Council recognized the government’s
ultimate authority over outside military forces that is inherent in sovereignty by
declaring that if requested by the government of Iraq the Council will terminate the
12-monthmandate of the US-led force.
The ongoing debate on how to realize the obligations imposed on the United
States and the United Kingdom by the grant of authority from the Council is just
the latest example of the interpretation of Council resolutions. In the case of Iraq
this has been a continuing issue, with the vast panoply of resolutions on Iraq being
subject to varying interpretations, nonemore so than Resolution 1441 adopted on 8
November 2002 as the impetus towards war was rapidly gainingmomentum.
4.1. Interpreting Resolution 1441
Powerful states do not always get what they want from the Council. In such a
situation there has been a trend towards such states interpreting Council decisions
in ways that breach the understanding underlying the resolution. In these cases
other member states, while not necessarily accepting the interpretations given to
the decision, will view the Council warily since it appears that action is being
taken in its name. This must again affect the authority of the Council. If it appears
49. N. D. White, ‘The United Nations and Democracy Assistance: Developing Practice within a Constitutional
Framework’, in P. Burnell (ed.),Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization (2000), 67.
50. I. Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations: The Power of Better Argument’, (2003) 14 EJIL 437, at 444.
51. See further A. Orakhelashvili, ‘The Post War Settlement in Iraq: The UN Security Council Resolution 1483
(2003) andGeneral International Law’, (2003) 8 Journal of Conﬂict and Security Law 307, at 312–13 for the view
that the peremptory norm of self-determination also requires that the resolution be interpreted in this way.
52. SC Res. 1511, 16 Oct. 2003. See also SC 4844thmtg, 16 Oct. 2003.
53. R. McCarthy, ‘US Must Quit Iraq before Vote, Say Sunnis’, Guardian Weekly, 29 Jan.–4 Feb. 2004. An interim
Iraqi constitution was agreed by the Iraqi Governing Council on 8March 2004.
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that resolutions can be pulled this way and that, or can be resurrected after a
number of years, or can be enforced even though there is no provision in them
for coercion, then member states will rightly view resolutions with a great deal of
scepticism. The continuation of such a trend, combinedwith the Council’s endemic
selectivity, means that member states will no longer respect the authority of the
Council. Its unique position in the international system as the primary body for
collective securitywill be undermined. The point is that it is not the effectiveness or
ineffectiveness of the Security Council that calls into question the Charter scheme,
but the authority theCouncil haswhen it takes action, and the effect on its authority
whenaction is takenunder its name. If it takes action that themajority donot accept
as clearly intra vires, then its authority is diminished; and if action is being taken
under its name that the majority does not accept as legitimate then its authority is
being abused and diminished. The latter in particular threatens the Charter scheme
for collective security, for it has led to states threatening or using force in the name
of the United Nations, thus potentially eroding the prohibition on the threat and
the use of force under Article 2(4).
Inmanyways the Iraqcrisisof2003was theculminationofadecadeofpressureby
theUnited States and theUnitedKingdomdirected at changing the legal framework
governing the use of force contained in the UN Charter, in a concerted effort to
widen both exceptions to the ban on the threat or use of force in Article 2(4)
– namely the right of self-defence contained in Article 51 – and military action
taken under the authority of the Security Council derived fromArticle 42. After the
adoption of Resolution 1441 on 8 November 2002, the United States and the United
Kingdom brought the above-mentioned pressures to bear bymaking the claim that
the resolution was sufﬁcient to justify the use of force against Iraq even though it
did not contain clear authorizing language. Furthermore, the United States claimed
that even if the resolution did not authorize force, and in the absence of a further,
clearer resolution, it still had the right to use force in self-defence against the threat
posed against it by Iraq. According to these views the use of force against Iraq was
justiﬁed under either or both exceptions to the ban on the use of force, despite the
fact that 1441 did not authorizemeasures necessary against Iraq (the acceptedmode
of delegation under Article 42) and the fact there had been no armed attack against
the United States by Iraq within the meaning of Article 51.
The focusherewill not be thepressure that has been exerted onArticle 51bywars
waged against Afghanistan54 and Iraq. Afghanistan must be understood in the con-
text of the emotions provoked by the horriﬁc and profoundly symbolic destruction
of the twin towers, while in Iraq, although much has been made of the Bush doc-
trine of pre-emptive defence, in the end the United States came back to arguments
about the interpretation and enforcement of Security Council resolutions demand-
ing the disarmament of Iraq.55 When considering themilitary actions in Iraq (2003),
54. See J. I. Charney, ‘The Use of Force Against Terrorism and International Law’, (2001) 95 AJIL 835, at 835,
questioning the claim of self-defence against Afghanistan. But see T. M. Franck, ‘Terrorism and the Right of
Self-Defense’, (2001) 95 AJIL 839, at 840.
55. UN Doc. S/2003/351, 21March 2003.
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Afghanistan (2001), and earlier in Kosovo (1999), there does seem to be signiﬁcant
practice by powerful states that lends credence to the idea that force can be used in
support of Security Council resolutions, especially (and probably only) those that
have made a crucial ﬁnding of a threat to or breach of the peace under Article 39
of the UN Charter, although they do not contain an express ‘authorization’ to take
‘necessary measures’. It is interesting that, in the three main conﬂicts mentioned,
reliance on this ground was strongest in two (Kosovo and Iraq), suggesting a prefer-
ence for a use of force that can be justiﬁedunder theUNcollective security umbrella
rather than customary rights that are exercised unilaterally. Indeed, in Afghanistan
much ismade of the fact that the Security Council apparently endorsed the exercise
of the right of self-defence.56 The greater legitimacy that UN authority brings57 has
created tremendous pressures within the Security Council and on its resolutions.
The desire to bring actions under the authority of the United Nations reﬂects an
acceptance of this as a mechanism for lawfully using force, but it also inevitably
results in spurious claims by some states to be acting under UN authority. It is also
telling that, despite the invocation of the Bush doctrine in September 2002,58 the
United States was persuaded at least temporarily not to invade Iraq on the basis of a
claim to pre-emptive self-defence but on the basis of a Security Council resolution.
The negotiation of Resolution 1441 tookmany weeks, and even then the result was
not a clear authorization to use force.
Despite the lack of clear authority in Resolution 1441, the United Kingdom in
particular subsequently interpreted it to justify the use of force against that country.
Interpretations of Security Council resolutions based on a purposive approach59
or, more accurately, the principle of effectiveness60 may be acceptable if the inter-
pretation reﬂects the views of the Security Council as a body. The ‘interpretive task
is to ascertain what the text means to the parties collectively rather than to each
individually’.61 Subsequent practice can be relied on to (re)interpret a resolution
when it reﬂects a shared understanding.62 Such practice has to be checked against
the limitations contained in theCharter andmust beundertaken in fulﬁlmentof the
purposes of the United Nations.63 Subject to these limitations, if the Council mem-
bers agree that a resolution’s wording amounts to an authority to use force then
that is what it means. If they disagree and some view it as granting such authority
56. SC Res. 1368, 12 Sept. 2001; SC Res. 1373, 28 Sept. 2001. But see E. P. J. Myjer and N. D. White, ‘The Twin
Towers Attack: An Unlimited Right to Self-Defence?’, (2002) 7 Journal of Conﬂict and Security Law 5, at 9–11.
57. C. Gray, ‘From Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use of Force Against Iraq’, (2002) 13 EJIL 1,
at 8.
58. ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, Sept. 2002, available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. See also the UK government’s assessment of the threat posed by Iraq in ‘Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government’, 24 Sept. 2002, available at
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kﬁle/iraqdosier.pdf.
59. M. Byers, ‘The Shifting Foundations of International Law: ADecade of ForcefulMeasures against Iraq’, (2002)
13 EJIL 21, at 25.
60. A. Aust,Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2000), 185.
61. See I. Johnstone, ‘Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretative Communities’, (1991) 12 Michigan
Journal of International Law 371, at 381, where he characterizes the interpretative process as ‘intersubjective
interpretation’.
62. S. Rosenne,Developments in the Law of Treaties (1989), 244.
63. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1962] ICJ Rep. 167–8.
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and others as not so doing, this does not signify that it grants authority, at least in
attributingmeaning to the Security Council as a whole, as a reﬂection of its will.
Interpreting a resolution of a body like the Security Council requires careful
consideration of the text and the discussions that led up to it.64 To interpret the
words of a resolution in a way that is directly contrary to the consensus (which
may be an agreement to disagree) underlying the resolution would undermine the
Council as a forum for achieving compromise. Military action undertaken with
Security Council authority is only permitted when there is agreement in that body
that such action is being authorized. Agreement to the effect that the Council
is authorizing the use of force has been achieved in the past by a formula that
combines the phrase ‘necessary measures’ with an ‘authorization’. This has clearly
been recognized in UN practice as authorizing the use of force inmany instances.65
However, there is no need to stick to this formula if themembers agree, for example,
that a threat of ‘serious consequences’ in the face of a ‘material breach’ signiﬁes the
authorizationofnecessarymeasuresor theuseof force. But clearly therewasno such
consensus. 66 As Johnstonecorrectlyobserves, ‘Inanycommunicativeenterprise, the
participants tend to operate according to a set of conventions, practices and shared
understandings’.67 The shared understanding of 1441 was that it did not amount to
an authority to use force against Iraq.
The consensus at the meeting at which the resolution was adopted was that it
did not authorize the use of force if Iraq was in material breach. Indeed, the United
States and the United Kingdom asserted to the other members in the meeting that
no ‘automaticity’ or ‘hidden triggers’ were contained in the resolution,68 but then
outside the meeting repeatedly stated that there was no legal need for another res-
olution.69 This unilateral interpretation was based on the fact that the resolution
not only invoked the concept of ‘material breach’ at several points but also stated
that Iraq had failed to take the ﬁnal opportunity to comply with its disarmament
obligations granted in the resolution, and thusmust face the ‘serious consequences’
warnedof. This argumentbuilt on theprevious justiﬁcationsput forward since 1991
by the United States and the United Kingdom that force was used against Iraq to en-
force its disarmamentobligations (for example in January1993andDecember1998).
64. Namibiacase, supranote38,at53.See furtherM.C.Wood, ‘TheInterpretationofSecurityCouncilResolutions’,
(1998) 2Max Planck Yearbook of UN Law 73, at 74–5, 79, 95.
65. SeegenerallyN.M.Blokker, ‘Is theAuthorizationAuthorized?PowersandPracticeof theUNSecurityCouncil
to Authorize the Use of Force by “Coalitions of the Able andWilling”’, (2000) 11 EJIL 541.
66. Gray, supra note 57, at 9.
67. Johnstone, supra note 50, at 456.
68. SC 4644th mtg, 8 Nov. 2002. Other members spoke about the lack of the automatic right to use force in the
resolution (Mexico, Russia, Bulgaria, Syria, Cameroon, China), labelled the ‘two-stage approach’ by France,
and the clear assurances about the lack of basis in the resolution for the use of force (Ireland, Colombia);
while Norway referred to the Council’s responsibility recognized in the resolution to secure international
peace. The sense of the meeting was best summed up by the representative of Ireland when he thanked the
sponsors of the resolution (United States and United Kingdom) for their assurances that the purpose of the
‘resolution was to achieve disarmament through inspections, and not to establish the basis for the use of
force’.
69. Outside the Security Council Blair stated, ‘Defy theUN’swill andwewill disarm you by force. Be in no doubt
whatever about that’. Bush stated, ‘The outcome of this crisis is already determined. The full disarmament
of weapons of mass destruction will occur. The only question for the Iraqi regime is to decide how. His
co-operationmust be unconditional or he will face severest consequences’. Independent, 9 Nov. 2002, 1 and 5.
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Indeed, they argued that the adoption of Resolution 1441 signiﬁed that the Security
Council endorsed their position thatmaterial breachof the disarmament provisions
of Security Council resolutions, from 687 (of 3 April 1991) to 1441,70 suspended the
operation of the ceaseﬁre Resolution 687, thus allowing states to use force under
the open-ended provisions of Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990. However, it is
clear from the statements made at the adoption of Resolution 1441 that it was not
the intention of the Council to endorse that argument, and that any response to
a material breach of the resolution would come from the Security Council, not
individual member states, in other words that the ‘serious consequences’ were to
be determined by the Council. The fact that the ﬁnal version of the resolution
left out the words of the original US and UK draft authorizing member states ‘to
use all necessary means to restore international peace and security in the area’ is
telling.71
Further, it isalsoclear fromthemeetingatwhich1441wasadopted,aswellas from
the history of Security Council diplomacy, that a combination of ‘material breach’
and ‘serious consequences’ in the resolution is not understood by the Security
Council to include the use of armed force,72 though that may be the subsequent
interpretation put on the phrase by the United States and the United Kingdom.
‘Serious consequences’ and ‘material breach’ were put in the resolution by the
United States and the United Kingdom to enable them tomake these arguments, as
was the recollection of previous resolutions including 678, but the non-acceptance
of this position by the rest of the Council signiﬁed that the use of force had not been
authorized by the SecurityCouncil as a reﬂection of itswill. It is true that Resolution
1441 came closer to the US and UK position than previous resolutions dealing with
the Iraqi breachofResolution687,73 but it didnotmeet the agreed requirements that
for states to take military action under the auspices of Chapter VII there must be a
clear and unambiguous mandate in the form of an authorization to use force.74 All
other arguments – unilateral interpretations and claims to a right of enforcement –
fall short, for the simple fact is that if the Council wants to authorize the use of force
it will do so using clearly accepted language. It has not done so in the case of Iraq
since the end of the conﬂict in 1991.75
While maintaining the position subsequently adopted outside the Council that
forcewas legally justiﬁed against Iraqwithout a further Council resolution, in Janu-
aryandFebruary2003 theUnitedKingdominparticularmoved towards theposition
that a further resolution was politically desirable, although an ‘unreasonable veto’
would not deter the United Kingdom from using force.76 Even then, the resolution
70. See, e.g., prior to the 1998 air strikes – The Times, 19 Feb. 1998.
71. See N. Grief, ‘The Iraq Hearing’, 19 Dec. 2002, www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/reports/archive/international/
iraq-hearing. shtml.
72. But see F. L. Kirgis, ‘Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq’s Final Opportunity to Comply with Disarma-
ment Obligations’,ASIL Insights (Nov. 2002).
73. See, e.g., SC Res. 1154, 2 Mar. 1998; 1194, 9 Sept. 1998; 1205, 5 Nov. 1998.
74. J. Lobel and M. Ratner, ‘Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorization to Use Force, Cease-ﬁres
and the Iraqi Inspection Regime’, (1999) 93 AJIL 124.
75. T. M. Franck, ‘What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq’, (2003) 97 AJIL 607, at 610–14.
76. A. Grice, ‘Deﬁant Blair Says UNHas No Veto onWar’, Independent, 14 Jan. 2003, 1.
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being mooted in early February by the United Kingdom still did not envisage a
clear authorization to use force, because in the absence of clear evidence of Iraqi
armaments this was thought by the United Kingdom to be unachievable, although
it did contain a further determination of a ‘material breach’. British ofﬁcials insisted
that this would constitute authority to use force.77 The contradiction in this argu-
ment is manifest, unless the members of the Security Council had indicated that
they had changed their minds and that such language did signify authorization to
use force. The unconvincing evidence of the existence in Iraq of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), apparent from the critical but not damning reports from the
heads of the UNMonitoring, Veriﬁcation and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of 27 January,78 14 February,79
28 February,80 and 7 March 2003,81 as well as the limited evidence presented to the
Council by theUS Secretary of State on 5 February, failed to persuademostmembers
of the Council to change their view that the use of force was not yet justiﬁed. On 14
February the US Secretary of State stated that it was not UNMOVIC’s job to produce
evidence of Iraqi breach, rather it was the responsibility of Iraq to disarm, which
it clearly had not done. According to the United States this was a further material
breach and a failure by Iraq to take the ﬁnal opportunity afforded to them in 1441
and should have led to the serious consequences called for in that resolution.82 The
UnitedKingdommade it clear that itwould supportUSmilitaryactionevenwithout
a further resolution. On 17 February the UK Foreign Secretary stated that ‘in terms
ofmandate Resolution 1441 gives us the authority we need, but in terms of political
desirabilitywehave always said thatwewouldprefer a second resolution’.83 Further,
on 21 February he stated that ‘diplomatic parlance is notoriously ambiguous, but in
this case the terminology had onemeaning: disarmament by force’.84
On 24 February the United States and the United Kingdom introduced a draft
second resolution into the Council, although they made it clear that it was for dis-
cussion and would not be voted on until after further reports from the weapons in-
spectors. Legally it seemed to add little to 1441. There was no explicit authorization
to use necessary measures. After invoking Chapter VII, the initial draft had one
77. D. Usborne, J. Lichﬁeld, P.Waugh, and A. Penketh, ‘Tony Blair, AManwith his Hands Full’, Independent, 8 Feb.
2003, 1.
78. S/PV 4692ndmtg, 27 Jan. 2003. Blix (UNMOVIC) concluded (p. 8) that there were serious gaps in knowledge
about Iraq’s chemical and bacteriological weapons programmes, and that Iraq was not fully co-operating.
He noted that UNMOVIC capability had increased over a short period of time, inferring that more time was
needed. El Baradei (IAEA) concluded by saying (p. 12) that ‘we have to date found no evidence that Iraq
has revived its nuclear weapons programme since the elimination of the programme in 1990’, but that a
more deﬁnite conclusion could be provided in the next fewmonths if the inspection process was allowed to
continue.
79. S/PV 4708thmtg, 14 Feb. 2003.
80. UN Doc. S/2003/232. This report by UNMOVIC was critical of Iraq, stating that it should show greater
credible evidence of disarmament. On 28 February Iraq started destroyingmissiles that exceeded the 150 km
permitted range. Blix, UNMOVIC’s chair, stated that this was a ‘very signiﬁcant piece of real disarmament’ –
UNNews Service, 28 Feb. 2003.
81. S/PV 4714th mtg, 7 March 2003. Blix referred to the destruction of missiles by saying, ‘we are not watching
the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal weapons are being destroyed’.
82. S/PV 4708thmtg, 14 Feb. 2003, 21.
83. S. Castle, ‘France Set to Block Second UN Resolution against Iraq’, Independent, 18 Feb. 2003, 1.
84. Independent, 22 Feb. 2003, 4.
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operative paragraph, where it ‘decides that Iraq has failed to take the ﬁnal op-
portunity afforded to it in Resolution 1441’. The preamble recalled 1441’s refer-
ence to material breach and warning of serious consequences. In effect it found
that Iraq had breached that resolution by ‘noting that Iraq has submitted a
declaration . . . containing false statements and omissions and has failed to com-
ply with, and to cooperate fully in the implementation of’ Resolution 1441.85 In
last-ditch attempts to make this draft acceptable and thus to avoid the threatened
vetoes of Russia and France as well as other probable negative votes, the United
Kingdom amended the draft to provide for a further short deadline, 17 March, for
Iraqi compliance, and ﬁnally to list the various actions Iraq had to undertake to
demonstrate compliance.86 This did not persuade Russia and France, which insisted
that the inspection process was working and should therefore be given several
months to work through.87 Furthermore, they were probably concerned that the
second resolution had become of such symbolic signiﬁcance for world opinion that
its adoptionwould be seen as giving a green light for war, despite the fact that it was
not viewed as so doing by the Council as a whole. More importantly for the United
States and the United Kingdom, a second resolution would have served domestic
purposes, particularly in the United Kingdom, where the public was much more
willing to support the use of force if a second resolution could have been adopted.
The failed efforts to obtain a second iconic resolution in the Council meant that
when full-scale conﬂict was engaged in Iraq on 20 March, American rhetoric had
moved towards claiming that the legal basis was self-defence by reiterating its reli-
ance on pre-emptive action.When debates were going against the draft on 7March
2003, President Bush stated that ‘we don’t really need the United Nations’ approval
to act . . .When it comes to our security, we do not need anyone’s permission’.88
Further, on 18March he outlined the nature of the threat. ‘The danger is clear. Using
chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with the help of Iraq,
the terrorists could fulﬁl their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of
thousands of innocent people in our country or any other’.89 However, in its letter
to the Council reporting its initiation of hostilities against Iraq, the United States
relied on Security Council resolutions.90
The United Kingdom preferred to argue solely that the war was legally justiﬁed
on the basis of existing Security Council resolutions. In a parliamentary written
answer on 17 March 2003, the Attorney General stated that the basis for force was
Resolution 678 of 1990, containing the original authority to use force. The Attorney
General argued that this authority was reactivated in the light of material breach of
Resolution687of1991,which imposedconditionson thedefeated Iraq including the
disarmament of its chemical, biological, and nuclear capability, and all subsequent
85. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/world/europe/2795747.stm.
86. UN Doc. S/2003/215, 7 March 2003.
87. See D. Usborne, ‘On the Brink ofWar’, Independent, 8 March 2003, 1.
88. R. Cornwell, ‘The Quiet Man’, Independent, 8 March 2003, 3.
89. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle east/2858965.stm.
90. UN Doc. S/2003/351, 21 March 2003. See further W. H. Taft and T. F. Buchwald, ‘Pre-emption, Iraq and
International Law’, (2003) 97 AJIL 557.
THE WILL AND AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AFTER IRAQ 661
disarmamentresolutionsuptoandincludingResolution1441.Heconcludedthat ‘all
that resolution 1441 requires is reporting to and discussion by the Security Council
of Iraq’s failures, but not an express further decision to authorize force’,91 since there
wasoriginal authority in678.Theweaknessof this argumenthasbeendemonstrated
by the fact that it was not accepted by othermembers of the Council – it is in effect a
misrepresentation of the will of the Council. This by itself is sufﬁcient to dispose of
theargument that reliesonaninterpretationofSecurityCouncil resolutions.Besides
which the interpretation itself is ﬂawed by reason of the fact that the authority of
Resolution 678 does not extend beyond Resolution 687, where the Council declared
in the ﬁnal paragraph that it remained ‘seized of the matter’ and would ‘take such
further steps as may be required for the implementation of this resolution and to
secure peace and security to the area’. The delegation of power to take military
action that occurred in Resolution 678 in November 1990 was effectively revoked
by Resolution 687 of April, including the authority in 678 to restore ‘international
peace and security to the area’.
For the Attorney General to state that ‘material breach of resolution 687 revives
the authority to use force under resolution 678’, which is the crucial step in his
reasoning back to 678, has no basis in those resolutions and thus no basis in law.
It represents an unconvincing attempt to unlock Resolution 678, which was the
only resolution in which the Council authorized necessary measures against Iraq.
Resolution 678 authorized member states ‘to use all necessary means to uphold
and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent resolutions and to restore
internationalpeace and security to thearea’.However, theCouncilmeetingatwhich
678was adopted showed thatmembers viewed this as giving theCoalition authority
to push Iraq out of Kuwait and to restore peace between the two states, not to take
any wider action.92 It thus could not be extended beyond the recapture of Kuwait.
The United Kingdom’s interpretation of Resolutions 678 (1990), 687 (1991), and
1441 (2002) in effect ignores the will of the Council expressed at the time of their
adoption.
It is interesting to see that in the year after the invasion of Iraq, with the oc-
cupation by the United States and the United Kingdom continuing, attention has
turned in both the United States and the United Kingdom to the issue of whether
there was evidence prior to the invasion that Iraq posed a sufﬁcient threat to those
countries.93 Though the political discourse in these countries seems to be turning
essentially to issues of self-defence, it must be remembered that the arguments that
the United States and the United Kingdom were enforcing or applying Council
resolutions on disarmament in the end rely heavily on there being WMD in Iraq.
Technically, however, a ‘material breach’ of Resolution 1441 does not necessarily
91. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk politics/2857347.stm (also (2003) 52 ICLQ 819). See further C. Greenwood,
supra note 25, at 35–6.
92. S/PV2963rdmtg, 29Nov. 1990, 78 (UK), 101 (US). Themeeting atwhichSCRes. 687, 3April 1991,was adopted
showed thatmember states viewed the authority to authorize furthermeasures as belonging to the Council,
not to those states acting under 678 – S/PV 2981, 3 April 1991, 85 (US), 111 (UK), 95 (China), 98 (USSR).
93. The main issue in the United Kingdom is the suspect evidence presented to Parliament at various points
before the outbreak of hostilities on 20March 2003 to the effect that Iraq could deployWMDwithin anhour
of the order being given. A. McSmith, ‘The 45-minute Case Collapses’, Independent, 8 Feb. 2004, 1.
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require there to be such weapons. However, in terms of convincing the public and
wider world opinion, the issue of whether Iraq hadWMD at the time of the conﬂict
is germane both to the self-defence argument (where their presence can be evalu-
ated in terms of the threat posed by them) and to the enforcement or application
of Council resolutions (where their presence would be a clear violation of those
resolutions).
The critical reaction ofmany states and other actors to the decision of the United
States and theUnitedKingdom to use forcewithout Security Council authority is of
course signiﬁcant in evaluating the legality of that action as well as the legitimacy
of their interpretations of Security Council resolutions. On 10 March, before the
outbreak of war, the UN Secretary-General was clearly of the opinion that it would
be unlawful when he warned that ‘if the US and others were to go outside the
Council and take military action it would not be in conformity with the Charter’.94
Criticisms of the impending war and warnings of illegality were voiced by the
majority of members of the Council when meeting on the eve of the war.95 After
full-scale forcewasunleashedby theUnitedStates andUnitedKingdomon20March
2003, therewere immediate statements condemning it as aviolationof international
law by China, Russia, France, Iran, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia, while
support was given by Australia, the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea.96
The Security Council debates on Iraq and the reactions of states to the unau-
thorized use of force on 20 March 2003 show that to argue that a new purposive
interpretative rule has been accepted that allows individual states unilaterally to
interpret and enforce Security Council resolutions and even the UN Charter97 does
not reﬂect the consensus of the international community. The fact that the same
minority of states that seeks to justify the above interventions argues for the emer-
gence of a new rule of interpretation is sufﬁcient to show that such arguments are
self-serving and are not accepted by the vast majority of states. In reality a Security
Council resolution is not a treaty text to be pulled this way and that over many
years, it is a document of an executive body charged with taking action within
its competence to fulﬁl the purposes of the UN Charter. As a piece of subsequent
practice adopted under the auspices of a treaty, each resolution exists primarily as a
reﬂection of the will of the Security Council.98 That will can change – for example
94. UNNews Service, 10March 2003, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnews.asp?nid=6399.
95. S/PV 4721 mtg, 19 March 2003. Statements by Germany, France, Russia, Syria, Pakistan, Mexico, Chile,
Angola, China. See also open meeting of Security Council S/PV 4717, 12 March 2003, when represent-
atives of 51 states spoke.
96. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle east/2867027.stm. The United States claimed that 30 countries
were supporting themilitary action. ‘Under the standards used by the current Bush administration, the size
of the 1991 coalition is likely to have beenmore than 100 countries’ – E.MacAskill, ‘US Lists Coalition of the
Willing’, GuardianWeekly, 27 March–2 April 2003, 5. In fact 34 countries contributed militarily to the 1991
campaign,while four countries contributed to the 2003 campaign (United States – 200,000personnel;United
Kingdom – 45,000; Australia – 200; Poland – 200). In 1991 the US-led coalition acted under a UN resolution
andhadbroad supportnotonly in theSecurityCouncil but also in theGeneralAssembly– seeGARes. 46/135,
17 Dec. 1991.
97. Byers, supra note 59, at 27.
98. Wood, supra note 64, at 77, 95. See also H. Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of
Justice’ (1996) 67 BYBIL 29. But see C. Stahn, ‘Enforcement of the Collective Will After Iraq’, (2003) 97 AJIL
804, at 822, for the view that the Iraq crisiswas a challenge to ‘the old dogma that theCouncil alone is entitled
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the Council could decide that Resolution 242 (1967) on the Middle East is clearly
binding on Israel – but that would require a further resolution or statement by the
Council as a whole.
5. SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORITY AND THREATS OF FORCE
However encouraging the critical reaction of states and other actors to the invasion
of Iraq, this should not automatically be taken at face value as a reassertion of
the fundamental norm contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter; in particular, it
must not be forgotten that that prohibition covers the threat as well as the use
of force. The question as to whether the Council and the wider membership had
half-compromised Article 2(4) by not condemning the threats of force made by
the United States and the United Kingdom against Iraq in the build-up to war
needs consideration. It may appear that states (and the Council) were more willing
to tolerate threats of force than the use of force. Indeed, it may seem justiﬁable
to tolerate threats of force as opposed to the use of force,99 but this ignores the
fact that threat and use are not so easily separated. Inevitably, if threats are to be
credible they must be carried through in the face of intransigence. Threats are not
somehow stand-alone devices. To make the threats of force against Iraq credible
there was a huge build-up of forces in the Gulf, creating a momentum towards war
that was difﬁcult to stop. Indeed, the slide from threat of war to war itself is seen in
the escalation of air strikes against Iraq early inMarch 2003 by theUnited States and
United Kingdom, even though diplomatically the decision to cross the threshold
from threat to use of force was not made until 20March.100
The fact that states do not appear willing to condemn threats should not readily
be interpretedas acceptanceof their legality, for if statesdonot accept theuseof force
they are also rejecting the threat of that use of force.101 Furthermore, one should
not quickly assume acceptance in the face of rules that are peremptory, such as that
prohibiting the threat or use of force in Article 2(4). When practice is apparently
violative of a peremptory norm, it is not enough to have acquiescence in the face
of the violation in order to establish a new or extended right. It is argued that there
needs to be more positive acceptance of the claim, positive proof that states have
accepted the modiﬁcation of the peremptory norm, proof in other words of opinio
juris. Arguments about acquiescence seem to assume the emergence of new rights
in a legal vacuum, but that is not the case. Brownlie puts this clearly when he states
that ‘the major distinguishing feature of such [peremptory] rules is their relative
indelibility. They are rules of customary law which cannot be set aside by treaty or
acquiescence but only by the formation of a subsequent customary rule to contrary
effect’.102
to interpret and enforce its will’.
99. R. Sadurska, ‘Threats of Force’, (1988) 65 AJIL 239.
100. R. Cornwell, ‘US Hits Roadblock in Push toWar’, Independent, 4 March 2003, 1.
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Evenifacquiescenceinthefaceofbehaviourthat iscontrarytoaperemptorynorm
were sufﬁcient, care must be taken in analyzing the quality of any acceptance that
may be implied.Whywould less developed andweak states accept the dismantling
of thecollective security structure that at leastprovides themwith rules thatpurport
to protect their vulnerability? In seeking an answer account must be taken of the
pressure being exerted on themnot to criticizemilitary action, and certainly not the
threat of military action, being taken against terrorist organizations or rogue states
by powerful states. President Bush sounded a warning against such criticism on
6November 2001, when he stated that those nations not ‘for’ the United States were
‘against us’.103 While acquiescence can be viewed as acceptance, onemust be careful
not to assume this. As Brownlie states, ‘the real problem is to determine the value
of abstention from protest by a substantial number of states in face of a practice
followed by some others. Silencemay denote either tacit agreement or a simple lack
of interest in the issue’.104 Clearly the latter does not constitute acceptance, and if
this is the case acceptance cannot be presumedwhen the silence is a result of fear of
the potential political and economic consequences of protest.
To overcome objections based on the peremptory nature of the customary rule
prohibiting the threat or use of force, arguments must be made that only parts of
Article 2(4) are jus cogens105 or that the rule as a whole is dead through constant
breach.106 Admittedly, in the face of regular breach even of fundamental rules, states
in the General Assembly and other fora must afﬁrm allegiance to the rule, for
even peremptory norms may eventually be eroded. There is a pressing need for a
declaratory General Assembly resolution reafﬁrming the rules on the use of force
in the post-ColdWar era. While there has been no recent resolution along the lines
of the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations107 or the 1987 Declaration on the
Non Use of Force,108 for instance, there have been references to the prohibition of
the threat and use of force in resolutions supported by the majority of states since
11 September,109 as well as some encouraging statements by the ICJ in the Oil
Platforms case.110
Furthermore, the Security Council, in its handling of the Iraq crisis in 2002–3
against the background of the threat of force by the United States and the United
Kingdom, did not endorse the threat of force. There is evidence that the threat of
103. BBC News, ‘Bush Urges Anti-Terror Allies to Act’, 6 Nov. 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/
americas/newsid_1642000/1642130.stm.
104. Brownlie, supra note 7, at 7–8.
105. R.Mu¨llerson, ‘Plus C¸a Change (leMonde) Plus C’est laMeˆme Chose (le Droit)?’ (2002) 7 Journal of Conﬂict and
Security Law 149, at 169.
106. T. M. Franck, ‘Who Killed Article 2(4) or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States’ (1970)
64 AJIL 809.
107. GA Res. 2625, 24 Oct. 1970.
108. GA Res. 42/22, 18 Nov. 1987.
109. GARes. 56/151, 19Dec. 2001, on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, adopted by
a vote of 109 to 53with 6 abstentions; GARes.56/152, 19Dec. 2001, on respect for the purposes and principles
contained in the Charter of the United Nations to achieve international co-operation in promoting and
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force that formed the background to the inspection process after the adoption of
Resolution 1441 in November 2002 was not ignored by Security Council members,
but no clear position was taken on it by that body. There was no doubt that the
threat of force by the United States and the United Kingdom in this period led to
Iraq’s acceptanceof anew inspectionprocess andgrudgingly slowco-operationwith
UNMOVIC and the IAEA. At one level all the Security Councilwas doingwas taking
advantage of the threat without endorsing it, and if it had decided to authorize the
use of force in a second resolution it would have been accepting the threat only
for the purpose of enforcing its will. The failure to authorize the use of force could
then been seen as a rejection of the threat that preceded it. However, the evidence
is that those states opposing a second resolution authorizing force in February and
March 2003 (principally France, Russia, and Germany) would have been content for
the inspection process to have continued, a process that was only possible due to a
threat of force.
The ambivalent attitude of states and the Council to threats of force, or what
has been called ‘diplomacy backed by force’, apparently endorsed by the Secretary-
General in 1998 in relation to Iraq,111 has a potentially erosive effect on the integrity
of Article 2(4). The United Kingdom in particular pointed to this weakness in the
position of those states opposed to force when the Foreign Secretary stated on
7March 2003 that ‘the paradox we face is that the only way we are going to achieve
disarmament by peace of a rogue regime –which all of us knowhas been in deﬁance
of this Council for the past 12 years – the only way we can achieve disarmament
of their weapons of mass destruction, which the Council has said poses a threat to
international peace and security, is by backing our diplomacywith a credible threat
of force’.112 While there is clearly a problemwith the Council taking advantage of a
threat of force by states, it is not possible to say that this amounts to an endorsement
of such threats, since states are very well aware that this would potentially remove
thebarrier to accepting that actual force canbedeployedby states to enforceCouncil
resolutions. Nevertheless, by not rejecting the threat of force, there is a danger to the
integrity of Article 2(4), although the above analysis shows that it still stands ﬁrm.
6. AUTHORITY FOUNDED ON RESPECT FOR LAW
The premise of this article is that the Council’s authority is maintained and
strengthened by respect for law, not only by the organ itself in expressing itswill but
by states purporting to implement thatwill. The lawof theCharter andprinciples of
international law should be respected by the Council when it is considering taking
action in new areas. Innovative action by itself is not a bad thing; indeed, it is to
be encouraged in an ever-changing security environment, but there are limits to
action. There is no doubt that the Council has a very wide competence, allowing it
in furtherance of the purposes of the United Nations to respond to threats to and
breaches of the peace. However, in rare instances where it adopts resolutions that
111. White and Cryer, supra note 101, at 281.
112. SC 4714mtg, 7 March 2003.
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only serve the purposes of a permanent member, as with Resolution 1422, and not
the collective security interest, then it is in danger of exceeding its competence.
Of course Council actions can further the national interests of individual states as
long as they fulﬁl the collective purposes of theUnitedNations. The initial GulfWar
of 1991, when US strategic considerations were married to the UN commitment to
combat aggression, is a good example.
Authority is being undermined by unilateral interpretations and enforcement of
Security Council resolutions. Even though these interpretations are dressed in legal
clothes, they are fundamentally anti-legal, given that they contradict the consensus
underlying the resolution. They, in effect, disregard thewill of theCouncil.Members
of the United Nations engaged in such exercises are undermining the authority of
the Council, a process that is exacerbated if the individual states are permanent
members of the Security Council. It is argued here that the authority of the Council
is dependent not only on that body exercising its will in accordance with law, but
also on the individual members themselves, in particular, given its special status,
eachpermanentmember. This duty applies not only to the interpretationofCouncil
resolutions but also to the exercise of the veto and to the issue of selectivity, both of
which will be brieﬂy considered here and in the conclusion.
6.1. Law and the veto
Arguments for enhanced Council authority based on law are undermined by the
pernicious use of veto. As Brierly pointed out in 1946, the veto is a signiﬁcant ﬂaw in
the constitutional ediﬁce of the Charter.113 For Council action to be taken to uphold
those fundamental principles embodied in the Charter there must be agreement
among the P5. This represents a realist core in an institutional framework – a
political core in a legal regime. Agreement or disagreement among the P5 is the key
to Security Council action or inaction, and negotiations between members of this
group are shaped by the existence of the veto. Although not often wielded formally
inopenmeetings in thepost-ColdWarera, the threat of theveto shapesnegotiations,
as the Iraq crisis of 2003 shows.
What is attempted in this argument is to show that it is possible to constrain
the use of the veto by law, while still leaving it intact as a core political power. To
recognize greater legal limitations on the veto than those that already notionally
exist is to accept the political reality of the continued presence of the veto but also to
address the real problemof its abusewhich is so undermining to the authority of the
Council. Thuswhile still remaining a special power belonging to a handful of states,
the exercise of the veto should only take place within recognized legal parameters.
This argument applies to the Council as a whole, which, as a body consisting of 15
member states, has extraordinary powers; however, as has been shown, these are
limited by Charter and international law.
Having said that, British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s reference to the ‘unreason-
able’ veto in February and March 2003,114 in relation to the French (and Russian)
113. J. L. Brierly, ‘The Covenant and the Charter’ (1946) 23 BYBIL 83, at 92.
114. Grice, supra note 76.
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threats to veto a second resolution that would have more clearly authorized the
use of force against Iraq, had no legal basis, at least in the sense used by the Prime
Minister. The French veto, although galling to the United Kingdom and to a lesser
extent the United States and therefore unreasonable from their perspectives, was
being threatened because of a belief that the best way forward was not through
the immediate use of force against Iraq but through a lengthier inspection pro-
cess designed to reveal the extent of Iraq’s violations of the Council disarmament
resolutions, a belief shared by the majority of the Council, and based on a shared
perception of Security Council Resolution 1441. TheUnitedKingdom felt aggrieved
that its view of Resolution 1441 – that its violation should have led to a second
resolution authorizing the use of force or even to an acceptance of the use of force
following mere discussions in the Council – was being ignored. However, the fact
was that the will of the Council had been clearly expressed at the time of the adop-
tion of 1441, even though the resolution itself was somewhat opaque, to the effect
that there were no ‘triggers’ or ‘automaticity’ in the resolution establishing a legal
basis for the use of force.115 This signiﬁes that the French interpretation of the res-
olution and the process that was to follow from it were not ‘unreasonable’ even in
a political sense, and certainly not in a legal sense. In the case of Iraq, the Council’s
failure to take further executive action was a product of disagreement between the
permanentmembers.With the veto being validly threatened in order to try to head
off precipitous military action, the permanent members should have resorted to
further diplomacy to resolve their differences and to achieve a compromise that
would have allowed the inspections to continue for a reasonable period. Depending
on the outcome of those inspections the Council would then have had to meet to
consider what further action, if any, should have been taken against Iraq.
The veto has traditionally been seen as a political expression of power reserved
for the Big Five; this was made brutally clear at Yalta even before the San Francisco
conference in 1945. There seemed to be a general acceptance from that point on that
it is an exercise of power untrammelled by law,116 and that is certainly the way it
has been exercised since 1945. The veto, however, is contained in a legal document,
and is deﬁned in terms that signify that, formally at least, there are legal limitations,
albeit limited ones, on its use. Thus there are Charter-based legal limitations on
the use of the veto as well as other legal limitations that could also be applicable.
The clear legal limitation on the power of veto is that any member of the Security
Council, including a permanent member, should abstain from voting if it is a party
to a dispute being dealt with by the Council under Chapter VI.117 Due to itswording
this limitation appears to have been of limited relevance in practice,118 but it is a
legal limitation nonetheless.
Legal restrictions on the veto should of course be extended to prevent the veto
of Chapter VI resolutions per se. This was argued by the smaller powers at San
115. SC 4644thmtg, 8 Nov. 2002.
116. B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations (2002), 514.
117. UN Charter, Art. 27(3).
118. S. D. Bailey and S. Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council (1998), 250–6.
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Francisco,but thatargumentwas lost.119 Ithasbeenrevisitedonnumerousoccasions
by theUNOpenEndedWorkingGroupontheQuestionofEquitableRepresentation,
which has unsuccessfully tackled the issue of reform of the Council, including the
veto, since 1994.120 There is no real reason why a permanent member should veto
resolutions proposed under Chapter VI concerning the peaceful settlement of a
dispute. The ‘chain of events’ theory (that a Chapter VI, or indeed a procedural,
resolution might be the ﬁrst step to a Chapter VII resolution) posited at Yalta was
disreputable then and discredited now.121 The permanentmembers should agree to
this. The real problem, however, is how to prevent the veto from operating to block
legitimate Chapter VII resolutions.
Is it possible to avoid the position whereby a permanent member violates UN
principles, thereby causing a threat to or breach of the peace itself, and then by the
use of the veto prevents Council action or even condemnation? The answer to this
question must, while the veto remains, be negative, for here the core of the veto
power, which is to prevent enforcement action being taken against a permanent
member (the negative facet of the veto), is represented. A more practical question is
how the problem whereby a permanent member vetoes a Chapter VII resolution
for illegitimate reasons that have nothing to do with the issue at hand and noth-
ing to do with preventing enforcement action from being taken against it can be
avoided.
A radical reform of the veto may seem a hopeless quest, given that amendment
to the Charter, whether formal or informal, requires the consent of each permanent
member.122 Furthermore, to argue for more legal limitations would appear to be
unrealistic, unless there are some mechanisms put in place for review of Security
Council practice, including the use of the veto. It is difﬁcult enough for the ICJ to
undertake sporadic instances of review, never mind developing a system of review.
Nevertheless, even without formal avenues of accountability, having clear legal
limitations placed on the right of veto would enhance the authority of the Council,
and would, within the current system whereby world opinion to a certain extent
performs the function of review, allow the Assembly, states, organizations, and indi-
viduals to evaluate the legalityof the exerciseof theveto, aswell as the consequences
of its use. In practical terms it is unlikely that anyChapterVII actionwould be taken
on thebasis of a vetoedCouncil resolution, at least against apermanentmember. But
such defeated draft resolutions may be given legal effects, rather than having none,
as is currently the case.123 Conﬁning the veto to proposedChapterVIImeasures that
affect the vital interests of a permanentmember, or are contrary to the purposes and
principles of the UN, or, as in the case of Iraq, are out of line with previous Coun-
cil decisions, may be a way forward.124 More speciﬁcally, the French proposal that
119. Russell andMuther, supra note 23, at 766.
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there should be no veto of proposed clearly deﬁned humanitarian interventions
should be adopted.125
While the above are meant by way of reform proposals or de lege ferenda, is
it possible to identify existing legal principles that can be applied to the veto –
de lege lata? For instance would it be realistic to recognize that the principle of
good faith applies to the veto? Recognizing the requirement that a veto must be
exercised in good faith, a principle that Franck argues is applicable to Security
Council activities,126 may serve to prevent the pernicious use of the veto. More
realistically, it can be argued that its exercise as a right, power, or privilege granted to
speciﬁc member states by the Charter must not violate the purposes and principles
of the UN Charter. Just as Security Council action can be evaluated in terms of its
compatibility with fundamental principles of international law as well as with the
purposes and principles of the UN Charter, so, it can be argued, should the exercise
of the veto. How many of the Cold War vetoes would have stood up well against
these requirements? Putting good faith and theveto together inone sentencemaybe
going too far; but testing the veto against the Security Council’s primary purpose –
that ofmaintainingpeace and security, is arguably legitimate. Furthermore, the veto
should not be used to block action that is aimed at preventing or tackling violations
of fundamental principles of international law.
Commentators have recognized that the veto is a ‘very special power’127 entailing
the granting of ‘extraordinary decision blocking competence’.128 It is suggested here
that such competence should be judged against the constitutional parameters of the
organization, and not merely by the ordinary rules governing voting. However, to
argue that the veto is an institutional power or right, notmerely the sovereign right
of a handful of states, is contrary to the orthodoxy that clearly states that the veto
vote like any vote in an international body is purely the exercise of a sovereign right.
The orthodoxy is that ‘the validity of the negative vote cannot be disputed’.129
But times have changed, and if post-Cold War practice is considered, when the
veto is being exercised with much more caution, it may be concluded that such a
limitation is workable. There are hints that the pernicious use of the veto is being
frowned on in the post-Cold War era, although the level of disapproval has not
yet reached the stage of what could be called institutional opinio juris to the effect
that such vetoes are unconstitutional. Mention can be made of the Chinese veto
preventing the sending of military observers to Guatemala in 1997 on the basis of
Guatemala’s perceived support for Taiwan.130 This was a short-lived blocking of
action. More serious was the Chinese veto for similar reasons of the extension
of the United Nations’ preventive deployment of troops to Macedonia in February
1999.131 In the Council chamber Macedonia stated that the Chinese veto was based
125. J. Stromseth, ‘Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention’, in J. F. Holzgrefe and R. O. Keohane (eds.),
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on ‘bilateral considerations’ which ‘we all consider to be in contradiction with
the Charter’. Canada also criticized China for acting out of concern for ‘bilateral
concerns unrelated to UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment Force]’. The United
States regretted the use of the veto, stating that ‘the overall interests of security in
the region . . . should be sufﬁciently compelling to outweigh other considerations’.
Slovenia stated that the failure to extendUNPREDEP’smandate reinforced the need
to reform the veto. China at ﬁrst stated that the stability of Macedonia meant that
there was no need to extend the mandate, but in response to criticisms later stated
that the accusations were unfounded and that ‘deciding on the merits of an issue
was the sovereign right of every State’.132
Both of these Chinese vetoes were based on grounds unrelated to peace and
security and could be said to be instances of the exercise of power thatwere contrary
to the purposes of the United Nations as regards the maintenance of peace and
security. The veto of UNPREDEP in Macedonia, a rare instance of UN preventive
peacekeeping, was shown to be disastrous as that country suffered a spillover of
violence from the Kosovo crisis, necessitating belated reactivemilitary deployment
byNATO in September 2001. The threatened US veto in July 2002 of an extension of
themandateof theUNmission inBosniaunless immunity fromthe ICCwasgranted
to its peacekeepers could also be viewed as problematic.133 The desire of the United
States to protect its personnel from prosecution134 seemed to be unconnected to
the peace and security of Bosnia, while the threat of the veto itself engendered a
potential security crisis in that country.
The Russian veto on 21April 2004 of a new force to replace theUNPeace-Keeping
Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to guarantee security on the island in the event of the
GreekandTurkishCypriots voting for theUNuniﬁcationplanon24April seemed to
be on ‘technical’ grounds rather than onmatters of substance. The technicalmatters
referred to by Russia seem mostly to have related to the ‘precipitous’ manner in
which the draft had been prepared by the United States and the United Kingdom
and negotiated informally.135 Although criticism of the Russian veto was muted in
the Council, probably in the hope that it would not undermine efforts to gain a
positivevoteinthereferenda, itmustbedoubtedwhethersuchavetowascompatible
with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Whether this failure by the
Council sent the wrong signal to the Greek Cypriots, who most wanted a security
guarantee,136 is impossible to gauge, although the fact is that they voted against the
plan on 24 April, thereby preventing the best chance for a solution to the island’s
division since the Turkish invasion of 1974.137
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However, the limitation on the veto imposed by theUN’s purposes andprinciples
will only catch the most obvious abuses. Of course a balance must be achieved
between limiting the exercise of the veto and its positive aspect – that it ensures that
Council action has the support of themost powerfulmembers. As the debates in the
Working Group show, the veto is unlikely to be given up by members of the P5 but
they may be willing, if they wish the Security Council containing a veto power to
have a future role, to subject it to legal standards that would allow for some form
of accountability for its use. As with the occasional Council resolution that does
not fulﬁl the purposes of the UN Charter but only furthers the agenda of one of
the P5, the occasional casting of a veto purely out of national interest that prevents
the Council fulﬁlling its primary function must be subject to legal standards and
accountability.Whereas institutional law has reached the stage of recognizing that
such a resolution can be ultra vires though there are no effectivemeans of enforcing
such a conclusion, it has not yet applied the same standards to the capricious use
of the veto. Such gaping legal holes in the Council’s constitution undermine its
authority.
7. CONCLUSION
Although it was the veto that largely prevented Council action during the Cold
War, the recent Iraq crisis is perhaps misleading if it suggests that more recent
Council inaction is mainly due to the veto.138 The last decade, when there has
been a reduction in the use of the veto, has brought to the fore the selectivity of
Council action. There has been an unwillingness by member states to initiate or to
contribute to effective executive action or effective behind-the-scenes diplomacy in
certainconﬂicts, forexampleinRwandain1994.Theinhumaneconﬂict intheCongo
is the current test of the Council’s resolve to deal with conﬂicts that do not concern
its permanentmembership.While the French andBritish contributed to a force sent
to the north-east of the Congo in June 2003 under a Security Council mandate,139
its size (1,400) suggests a continued lack of real commitment. This is borne out by a
leaked Frenchmilitary brieﬁng document obtained by theGuardiannewspaper that
was pessimistic as to the value of the force, stating that the ‘operation is politically
andmilitarilyhighrisk; very sensitiveandcomplex. Francehasnospeciﬁc interest in
the area except solidarity with the international community’.140 The token gesture
to solidarity speaks volumes. However, a more encouraging sign is the French and
US operation in Haiti in March 2004, operating under a Chapter VII mandate.141
Clearly the selectivity of the Council is a major issue as regards its continued
credibility. Although there is a balance to be achieved in the Council between
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the executive and diplomatic functions, the latter is not to be taken as an excuse for
inaction. Indeed, if the lackofaction isnotbecauseof thevetobutdueto indifference,
to collective inertia rather than genuine disagreement, then the Council is failing
in both its functions. This should be remedied by each permanent member taking
its Council responsibility for international peace and security seriously, rather than
each being primarily concerned with threats to its own security. It is argued here
that the Council’s primary responsibility for peace and security is the responsibility
of each permanent member. It is often recognized, not least in the rhetoric of the
permanent members, that the special position of permanent membership entails
duties; there needs to be speciﬁcation of those duties. For instance, in parliamentary
debates about the sending of UK troops to eastern Zaı¨re in 1996 as part of a later
abortedUN-authorized Chapter VIImultinational operation,142 theUK Secretary of
State for Defence stated,
TheHousewill rightly askwhy Britain should become involved in a place far fromour
country and where no vital interest is engaged. It is because we are a civilised nation.
We can see that people are about to die in their thousands, and we are one of the few
nations on earth that has the military capability to help at least some of them. We
recognise our humanitarian obligation.We take pride in our permanent membership
of the United Nations Security Council, but it carries with it clear duties.143
An inability by the current P5 to accept their responsibility within the Security
Council, either at an executive or a diplomatic level, in relation to threats to and
breaches of the peace wherever they occur, may well be the best justiﬁcation for
expanding the permanent membership to include states that can bring initiatives
and resources to the Council for dealingwith conﬂicts in Africa and other neglected
areas of theworld. It is also a further justiﬁcation for again recognizing andutilizing
the exceptional subsidiary responsibility of the General Assembly.
Has the Iraq crisis of 2003 fatally undermined the authority of the Council? Al-
though it seems to be business as usual after the adoption of Resolutions 1483 (2003)
and 1546 (2004) with regard to ‘post-conﬂict’ Iraq, it may be doubted whether the
Council’s authority could survive another crisis of the typewitnessed inKosovo and
Iraq,when it successfully fulﬁlled neither its executive nor its diplomatic functions.
Without change, that authority will be much reduced and there will be a ‘margin-
alization of the Council on matters of peace and security’.144 With change – which
has to be driven by the permanentmembers limiting their right of veto, recognizing
their Council responsibilities for peace wherever it is ruptured, and proposing and
interpreting resolutions that accord with the Charter, fundamental principles of
international law, and the will of the Council – it stands a chance of performing a
central role in maintaining peace and securing justice.
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